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10	FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA		
11	SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION		
12			
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	STATE OF CALIFORNIA, by and through XAVIER BECERRA, ATTORNEY GENERAL; and STATE OF NEW MEXICO, by and through HECTOR BALDERAS, ATTORNEY GENERAL, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT; KATHARINE S. MACGREGOR, Acting Assistant Secretary for Land and Minerals Management, United States Department of the Interior; and RYAN ZINKE, Secretary of the Interior, Defendants.	Case No. 3:17-cv-03804-EDL Consolidated with: Case No. 3:17-cv-03885-EDL PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO TRANSFER Date: September 19, 2017 Time: 9:00 a.m. Courtroom: Courtroom E, 15th Floor Judge: Hon. Elizabeth D. Laporte	
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INTRODUCTION

In these consolidated cases, the States of California and New Mexico ("Plaintiffs") challenge an action by the U.S. Bureau of Land Management, et al. (the "Bureau" or "Defendants") to "postpone" certain compliance dates of the Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties and Resource Conservation rule ("Waste Prevention Rule" or "Rule"). 82 Fed. Reg. 27,430 (June 15, 2017) ("Postponement Notice"). Plaintiffs contend that the Bureau's reliance on Section 705 of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 705, to issue the Postponement Notice almost five months after the Rule's effective date was unlawful and violated several requirements of the APA.

Defendants now seek to transfer these cases to the District of Wyoming, where two separate lawsuits challenging the validity of the Waste Prevention Rule itself are already pending. See Defendants' Motion to Transfer these Actions to the U.S. District Court for the District of Wyoming ("Motion"), Dkt. No. 14. However, the factors considered by this Court in deciding a motion to transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) weigh strongly in favor of keeping venue in this District. The State of California's choice of venue in its home forum is entitled to substantial deference, and the remaining factors either weigh against transfer or are neutral. Defendants' primary contention—that the interest of justice favors transfer because the District of Wyoming is already familiar with the Waste Prevention Rule—is unavailing, given that Plaintiffs' claims in this case are based on a separate agency action and statutory provisions of the APA that are not before the Wyoming court. Therefore, this Court should deny Defendants' Motion.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to Section 1404(a), "[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Determining whether an action should be transferred under this statute is a two-step process. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Lubchenco, 2009 WL 4545169, *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2009). First, the reviewing court must determine whether the action "might have been brought" in the transferee court, i.e., whether the proposed transferee court is a proper venue for

1	the action. <i>Id.</i> Second, "the plain language of the statute requires the Court to consider at least			
2	three factors in deciding whether to transfer a claim to another court: (1) convenience of parties;			
3	(2) convenience of witnesses; and (3) in the interest of justice." <i>Natural Wellness Ctrs. of Am.</i> ,			
4	Inc. v. J.R. Andorin Inc., 2012 WL 216578, *9 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2012). In addition, "Ninth			
5	Circuit precedent requires that courts also weigh the plaintiff's choice of forum." <i>Id.</i> (citing <i>Sec</i> .			
6	Investor Prot. Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1317 (9th Cir. 1985)).			
7	In conducting this analysis, courts in this district generally consider the following eight			
8	factors:			
9 10 11	(1) the plaintiff's choice of forum; (2) the convenience of the parties; (3) the convenience of the witnesses; (4) ease of access to evidence; (5) familiarity of each forum with applicable law; (6) feasibility of consolidation of other claims; (7) any local interest in the controversy; and (8) the relative court congestion and time [to] trial in each forum.			
12	Doe v. Uber Techs., Inc., 2017 WL 2352032, *3 (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2017); see Natural Wellness			
13	Ctrs., 2012 WL 216578, at *9; Jones v. GNC Franchising, 211 F.3d 495, 498-99 (9th Cir. 2000)).			
14	"The party moving to transfer venue under Section 1404(a) bears the burden of establishing			
15	the factors in favor of transfer." Earth Island Inst. v. Quinn, 56 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1115 (N.D. Cal.			
16	2014) (citing Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 279 (9th Cir. 1979))			
17	ARGUMENT			
18	I. WYOMING IS A PROPER VENUE ONLY BECAUSE THE BUREAU RESIDES THERE— JUST AS IT RESIDES IN CALIFORNIA AND MANY OTHER STATES.			
19	The State of California does not dispute that this action "might have been brought" in the			
20	District of Wyoming, but disagrees with the rationale provided by Defendants on this issue. See			
21	Motion at 5-7. Pursuant to the federal venue statute, a civil action against an agency or officer of			
22	the United States may be brought in any judicial district "in which (A) a defendant in the action			
23	resides, (B) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a			
24	substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (C) the plaintiff resides if			
25	no real property is involved in the action." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1).			
26	Here, the Bureau "can properly be considered a resident of both Wyoming and California"			
27	because it maintains an office and manages land in both states (Motion at 6 n.2), allowing for			
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venue in either district. However, that is the <i>only</i> basis for venue in Wyoming under 28 U.S.C. §			
1391(e)(1). Plaintiffs disagree that "the events underlying Plaintiffs' claims" occurred in			
Wyoming. Motion at 6. This case challenges Defendants' issuance of the Postponement Notice,			
which delayed the compliance dates for certain provisions of the Waste Prevention Rule that were			
operative in many states, including California. See 82 Fed. Reg. at 27,430-31; Motion at 1 ("The			
Rule applies to the development of federal and Indian minerals nationwide"). The Postponement			
Notice was signed by Defendant Katharine S. MacGregor, a Bureau official based in Washington,			
D.C., and directed interested parties to contact officials at the Bureau's Washington, D.C. office			
for further information. 82 Fed. Reg. at 27,430-31.			

Moreover, Plaintiffs dispute that "a substantial part of the property potentially affected by these actions is in Wyoming." Motion at 6-7. First, the Waste Prevention Rule impacts oil and gas leases on public lands across the nation, including millions of acres in California. Further, the location of potentially impacted property is not a relevant consideration in this case. As this court recently found, "by using the legal term 'real property' rather than allowing venue whenever 'the action relates [to] a particular area of land,' Congress seems to have indicated that it intended mainly to cover disputes over legal interests in real property." *Earth Island Inst.*, 56 F. Supp. 3d at 1115-16; *see also Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Tenn. Valley Auth.*, 340 F. Supp. 400, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (finding that the issue "cannot sensibly be whether real property is marginally affected by the case at issue. Rather, the action must center directly on the real property, as with actions concerning the right, title or interest in real property"), *rev'd on other grounds*, 459 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1972). This is not a case that involves a challenge to a right, title, or interest in "real property," but rather challenges the Bureau's adherence to statutory and procedural requirements surrounding agency rule making under the APA. Consequently,

California has more acres of federal mineral estate administered by the Bureau than Wyoming.

Cf. Motion at 6 ("Wyoming contains 40.7 million acres of federal mineral estate") with

Complaint ¶ 12 ("In California, the Bureau administers 15.2 million acres of public lands, nearly

Complaint, ¶ 12 ("In California, the Bureau administers 15.2 million acres of public lands, nearly 15 percent of the State's land area, as well as 47 million acres of subsurface mineral estate and 592,000 acres of Native American tribal land").

Plaintiffs' choice of venue was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)(C) because the State of California resides in this District.

In sum, while the District of Wyoming may be a proper venue based on the fact that the Bureau has an office and manages land in that state, this District is a more appropriate venue for the action under Section 1391(e)(1).

II. PLAINTIFFS' CHOICE OF FORUM, THE CONVENIENCE FACTORS, AND THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE FAVOR VENUE IN THIS DISTRICT.

A. Plaintiffs' Choice of Forum is Entitled to Substantial Deference.

Defendants' Motion fails to address the substantial deference afforded to the State of California's choice of forum in this District. "Ordinarily, a plaintiff's choice of forum receives substantial deference, especially when the forum is within the plaintiff's home district or state." *Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. McCarthy*, 2015 WL 1535594, *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2015) (citing *Lou v. Belzberg*, 834 F.2d 730, 739 (9th Cir. 1987)); *see Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno*, 454 U.S. 235, 255-56 (1981) (recognizing the "strong presumption in favor of the plaintiff's choice of forum," and that "plaintiff's choice of forum is entitled to greater deference when the plaintiff has chosen the home forum"); *Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert*, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947) ("unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed"). In the context of standing, the U.S. Supreme Court has also held that states are entitled to "special solicitude" based on their "well-founded desire to preserve [their] sovereign territory." *Mass. v. EPA*, 549 U.S. 497, 518-19 (2007).

While there are situations where a plaintiff's choice of forum is entitled to less deference, this case is not one of them. *See, e.g., Fabus Corp. v. Asiana Express Corp.*, 2001 WL 253185, *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2001) ("[t]he degree to which courts defer to the plaintiff's chosen venue is substantially reduced where the plaintiff does not reside in the venue or where the forum lacks a significant connection to the activities alleged in the complaint."). Here, the State of California has chosen to file this action in a home venue, where significant oil and gas activities are affected by the Postponement Notice. *See* Complaint, ¶¶ 12, 14; Affidavit of James Ticehnor, Dkt. No. 14-1, ¶ 4(b); U.S. Bureau of Land Management, "BLM Releases Draft Plan for Oil and Gas

Leasing in Central California" (Jan. 5, 2017), *available at*: https://www.blm.gov/press-release/blm-releases-draft-plan-oil-and-gas-leasing-central-california.

"Unless the balance of the Section 1404(a) factors weighs heavily in favor of the defendants, 'the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed." *Lubchenco*, 2009 WL 4545169, at *4 (quoting *Sec. Investor Prot. Corp.*, 764 F.2d at 1317); *see Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co.*, 805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir. 1986) ("The defendant must make a strong showing of inconvenience to warrant upsetting the plaintiff's choice of forum."). Defendants have failed to make such a showing. In fact, as discussed below, the remaining factors regarding convenience and the interest of justice strongly favor keeping the action in this District.

B. The Convenience of the Parties Weighs Strongly Against Transfer.

The convenience of the parties factor weighs strongly in favor of keeping the action in this District. Defendants' assertion that "the District of Wyoming is a more convenient forum" because the State of California and other parties are already involved in litigation there is misplaced. *See* Motion at 10. The fact that Plaintiffs chose to get involved in existing litigation in Wyoming as defendant-intervenors to protect their States' interests in the Waste Prevention Rule does not somehow transform Wyoming into a preferred forum that is as convenient as this District or more so.² In reality, there are significant hurdles involved with Plaintiffs' participation in litigation in the District of Wyoming, including travel costs, the need for *pro hac vice* admission, securing local counsel to participate in all phases of the proceedings, and additional paperwork associated with out-of-state travel. *See McCarthy*, 2015 WL 1535594, at *4 (finding that transfer would "materially inconvenience plaintiffs" due to "increased travel costs and procedural hurdles, such as paying for costs of admission *Pro Hac Vice* and the retention of local counsel"). However, the same is not true for Defendants, who are primarily based in Washington,

² It is worth noting that while the District of Wyoming is far less convenient than this forum, Plaintiffs respected the forum choice of the State of Wyoming and other Petitioners and did not seek to transfer venue to California or New Mexico.

³ U.S. District Court for the District of Wyoming, Civil Local Rules (Mar. 4, 2014), Local Rule 84.2(b).

⁴ *Id*.

⁵ See Cal. Gov't Code §§ 11032-33 (requiring special approval for travel or conducing state business outside of the state).

D.C., and are exempt from the District of Wyoming's *pro hac vice* and local counsel requirements.⁶ In addition, Defendants' counsel appear to be primarily based in Washington, D.C. and Denver, Colorado.

Finally, Defendants' assertion that this District is "significantly less convenient" for them because of the existing litigation in the District of Wyoming (*see* Motion at 10) mischaracterizes the relationship between this action and the challenges to the Waste Prevention Rule in Wyoming. *See infra* at Part II.C. In any event, a motion to transfer should be denied where it would "merely shift rather than eliminate the inconvenience." *Decker Coal*, 805 F.2d at 843; *see STX, Inc. v. Trik Stik, Inc.*, 708 F. Supp. 1551, 1556 (N.D. Cal. 1988) ("If the gain to convenience to one party is offset by the added inconvenience to the other, the courts have denied transfer of the action.").

Thus, the convenience of the parties factor supports venue in this District.

C. The Litigation Challenging the Waste Prevention Rule and the Unlikelihood of Consolidation Do Not Favor Transfer.

The primary contention made by Defendants is that the "interest of justice" favors transfer "[b]ecause the District of Wyoming is intimately familiar with the Waste Prevention Rule," and that court could "consolidate these cases with the litigation already pending in that court." Motion at 7-10. However, this argument misrepresents the relationship between the present action and the litigation in Wyoming. In reality, there are no common questions of law or fact between these two actions that warrant consolidation or transfer to the District of Wyoming.

In this action, Plaintiffs challenge the June 15, 2017 decision by Defendants to "postpone" certain compliance dates of the Waste Prevention Rule pursuant to Section 705 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 705. *See* Complaint, Dkt. No. 1. In particular, Plaintiffs allege that (1) by its plain language, Section 705 does not provide Defendants with authority to postpone a rule that has already gone into effect; (2) Defendants' attempt to postpone certain compliance dates in the Rule after it became effective constitutes an improper end-run around the APA's notice-and-comment requirements; (3) Defendants ignored the four-part preliminary injunction test required to

⁶ U.S. District Court for the District of Wyoming, Civil Local Rules (Mar. 4, 2014), Local Rule 84.2(d). Defendants are also exempt from the *pro hac vice* and local counsel requirements in this District. *See* Local Rule 11-2.

postpone a rule pursuant to Section 705; (4) Defendants are not authorized to postpone a Rule under Section 705 in order to administratively reconsider it; and (5) Defendants' issuance of the Postponement Notice was arbitrary and capricious because they failed to consider the environmental or public health and safety benefits of the Rule, or royalty revenues to the States. See id. ¶¶ 38-60. The parties are already briefing a motion for summary judgment, which is set for hearing on September 25, 2017. See Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. No. 11.

In the Wyoming litigation, two industry groups and the States of Wyoming and Montana (later joined by North Dakota and Texas) (collectively, "Petitioners") challenged the Waste Prevention Rule, promulgated on November 18, 2016, on the alleged basis that Defendants did not have statutory authority to regulate air pollution and that the Rule was arbitrary and capricious. *See* Motion at 2-3; *Wyoming v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior*, 2017 WL 161428 (D. Wyo. Jan. 16, 2017). Specifically, the Petitioners alleged that the Rule exceeds the Bureau's statutory authority by comprehensively regulating air quality, and was arbitrary and capricious because the Bureau improperly considered the "social cost of methane" and emissions reductions and otherwise imposed significant costs to achieve *de minimus* benefits. *See Wyoming*, 2017 WL 161428, at **5-10.7 The administrative record for that case has already been completed, and briefing on the merits is currently set for October and November 2017, with no date set for a hearing. *See* Dkt. No. 11-1, Exhibit E (Order Granting Motion to Extend Briefing Deadlines).

Defendants' assertion that transfer of this action to Wyoming will "avoid multiple litigations based on a single transaction," or "conserve[] judicial resources and avoid[] duplicative litigation and potentially inconsistent results" is incorrect. *See* Motion at 7 (quoting *Wireless Consumers Alliance, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.*, 2003 WL 22387598, **4-5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2003)). In fact, the *Wireless Consumers* case cited by Defendants is nothing like the situation here. In that litigation, the court found that the two cases at issue were "intimately related, if not identical," and "nearly all of the claims [in the later-filed action] were copied verbatim from [the first-filed action].") *Wireless Consumers*, 2003 WL 22387598, at *5. By contrast, the cases here

⁷ As defendant-intervenors in that action, Plaintiffs contest all of these allegations.

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1	challenge two separate agency actions, and are not based on a "single transaction." See id. None		
2	of the claims in Plaintiffs' challenge to the Postponement Notice are at issue in the District of		
3	Wyoming. The administrative record in the District of Wyoming does not include the		
4	Postponement Notice or any documents post-dating the issuance of the Waste Prevention Rule in		
5	November 2016. Consequently, there is no threat of duplicative litigation or inconsistent results		
6	if this Court reviews Plaintiffs' Section 705 challenge to the Postponement Notice, while the		
7	District of Wyoming continues to address Petitioners' challenges to the Waste Prevention Rule. ⁸		
8	While it is true that the District of Wyoming has some familiarity with the Waste		
9	Prevention Rule, this does not provide the substantial savings in judicial economy that		
10	Defendants suggest, for several reasons. See Motion at 7-9. First, the issues surrounding		
11	Defendants' issuance of the Postponement Notice and compliance with Section 705 are not before		
12	that court. Second, as demonstrated in Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 11),		
13	this Court does not need to evaluate the merits of the Waste Prevention Rule (Motion at 8) in		
14	order to determine whether the Bureau violated Section 705 when it issued the Postponement		
15	Notice. Third, resolving the issue of whether Defendants considered the four-part preliminary		
16	injunction test in the Postponement Notice (see Dkt. No. 11 at 12-13) does not require this Court		
17	to evaluate the preliminary injunction motions filed by the Petitioners in the Wyoming litigation		
18	(which the District of Wyoming court has already denied) or even weigh the preliminary		
19	injunction factors at all. See Motion at 9.9 Rather, the Court need only determine whether or not		
20	the Bureau examined these factors in its issuance of the Postponement Notice.		
21	In sum, the significant differences between the District of Wyoming matter and this action		
22	render this factor neutral. Even assuming a minor benefit to judicial economy, that does not		
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⁸ To the contrary, this Court is already considering another APA Section 705 challenge involving a Department of the Interior rule. See People of the State of California, et al. v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Case No. 3:17-cv-02376 EDL (N.D. Cal. complaint filed Apr. 26, 2017). Thus, judicial economy and the potential for inconsistent results actually warrant maintaining the action in this

⁹ Moreover, Defendants do not even agree that the preliminary injunction test "is relevant to an agency's postponement of future compliance dates under Section 705." Motion at 9.

outweigh the other convenience or justice factors, let alone the substantial deference afforded to Plaintiffs' choice of forum.

D. The Court Congestion Factor Weighs Against Transfer.

Considerations of court congestion also favor keeping the action in this District. "Courts may use the average time between filing and disposition or trial as a measure for court congestion." *McCarthy*, 2015 WL 1535594, at *5; *see Am. Civil Liberties Union of N. Calif. v. Burwell*, 2017 WL 1540606, *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2017). According to the latest data, the average time between filing and disposition in this District is 7.4 months, compared to 9.6 months in the District of Wyoming. *See* United States District Courts—National Judicial Caseload Profile (Mar. 31, 2017), *available at*:

http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/fcms_na_distprofile0331.2017.pdf. This two-month difference is significant given the January 2018 compliance dates at issue, and weighs against transfer of this action. *See Lubchenco*, 2009 WL 4545169, at *4 (finding "a modest difference in the congestion of the courts' calendars that weighs slightly against transfer").

E. The Remaining Factors Are Neutral.

Plaintiffs agree that the remaining factors regarding convenience and the interest of justice are neutral. *See* Motion at 11. With regard to the convenience of the witnesses factor, there are no witnesses to consider because this action does not involve disputed material facts and should be decided on motions for summary judgment. *See Lubchenco*, 2009 WL 4545169, at *3. Similarly, the ease of access to evidence factor is neutral in this APA action. *See id*. ("documentary evidence is easily transported to any venue, in this era of electronic communication"). Finally, the familiarity of each forum with applicable law factor is neutral, as the relevant courts in both California and Wyoming are familiar with the APA. *See id*. ("Both California and Alaska courts are equally familiar with the environmental laws at issue.").

Defendants initially characterize the local interest in the controversy factor as one favoring transfer, *see* Motion at 10-11, but their actual description of this factor appears to be neutral. *Id.* at 11 (stating that "Wyoming has ties to and an interest in these cases that is at least equal to that of California," and "California has no more of an interest in [the issue of climate change] than

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1	Wyoming"). Both states have a significant amount of federal fossil fuel development impacted		
2	by the Rule, and California has more federal mineral estate lands. See supra at Part I. Moreover,		
3	given that the Waste Prevention Rule "applies to the development of federal oil and Indian		
4	minerals nationwide," Motion at 1, Plaintiffs believe that this action does not constitute a		
5	localized controversy that favors any particular venue under this factor.		
6	CONCLUSION		
7	For the reasons stated above, Defendants have failed to demonstrate that the convenience		
8	and interest of justice factors warrant disturbing Plaintiffs' choice of forum. Consequently,		
9	Defendants' motion to transfer should be denied.		
10			
11	Dated: August 9, 2017	Respectfully Submitted,	
12		XAVIER BECERRA	
13		Attorney General of California DAVID A. ZONANA	
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15		/s/ George Torgun GEORGE TORGUN	
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19		Hector Balderas Attorney General of New Mexico	
20		/s/ Ari Biernoff	
21		ARI BIERNOFF BILL GRANTHAM (pro hac vice pending)	
22		Assistant Attorneys General	
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