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Catch shares save commercial fishing jobs

Catch shares are key to making sure we have commercial fishing jobs in the future. Fishing jobs depend on abundant stocks, but in the U.S. scientists can only say for sure that about 25% of our fish stocks are sustainable. Catch shares are proven to end overfishing and rebuild stocks.1,2,3

Fishermen all over the country are currently going out of business because of dwindling stocks and increasing regulations. For example, the collapse of the North Atlantic cod fishery in the early 1990s resulted in the loss of an estimated 20,000 jobs and $349 million from the New England economy.4 Today’s fishing jobs are dangerous, part-time, and relatively unstable. Jobs under well-designed catch shares tend to be full-time, higher-paying, safer and more secure over the short and long terms.

And importantly, catch shares can be designed to preserve what people value about their fishing fleets, whether that is limiting the concentration of quota ownership, preserving the owner-operator nature of the fleet, or increasing economic efficiency.

Today we face a crossroads: we need to end overfishing and restore many important fish species. Doing this under status quo management will mean ever-shorter fishing seasons and wide-ranging closures, ultimately leading to fewer and fewer jobs and more lost economic opportunities. Catch shares, on the other hand, will mean continued fishing opportunity and better jobs – even when catch limits must be reduced to restore the stock. The overall number of jobs may even increase, as stocks rebound and catch limits rise.

Derby-style fishing hurts overall employment and individual fishermen

In conventionally-managed fisheries, intense derby-style races-to-fish are often concentrated into one or more short seasons. This requires a large part-time work force to maintain round-the-clock fishing and to replace those who are hurt or sick from such intensive work. Sadly, this is the norm in fisheries where a whole season’s income hinges on relatively few days of fishing, and is known as “labor stuffing”.5

Under derby scenarios, it is possible for a boat to land a big catch and for the crew to make a lot of money in a short period of time. But, just as often, the opposite is true. In fact, when a boat gambles in a derby-style fishery and doesn’t land a big catch, crew members are sometimes left owing money to the boat.

As fishery managers are required to end overfishing in the next two years, status quo management will lead to more and more closures, and even fewer fishing jobs. A recent review of 10 U.S. and British Columbia fisheries showed that derby-style management dropped full-time employment opportunities by 66%.6

Under conventional management, jobs are being lost around the country from declining fish stocks and tightening regulations. This trend will continue unless a management shift is made to stabilize the situation.

Catch share fishermen see more stable jobs, higher pay

There is an alternative that stabilizes the job declines associated with conventional management, benefiting both fish stocks and fishermen. Under catch shares, jobs become more stable, full-time and better-paying. Fisheries that have already made the switch enjoy longer seasons, and saw a significant increase in full-time employment.7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15 In fact, the total amount of labor needed in these fisheries – measured in fishing hours per season – often doesn’t change, and in some cases actually increased slightly with a transition to catch shares.16

And, catch shares mean more money for participating fishermen. The handful of fisheries in North America that have already transitioned to catch shares saw an 80% increase in revenues within five years of implementation.17 Furthermore, restoring depleted fish stocks around the country would increase their direct economic value by about 50% - or an estimated $2.2 billion.18 The resulting downstream benefits would be tremendous, both in value and job opportunities.

Fishing crew do better under catch shares too. Catch shares approximately doubled the amount of revenue per crew position in the Alaskan halibut fishery from 1995 to 200819, while British Columbia groundfish crew saw their pay increase by 60%.20 In addition to significantly improving wages, the switch to catch shares in the BC groundfish fishery increased fleetwide catches, prices, and revenues, along with active vessel numbers, total crew jobs, and crew job duration.21

There is no doubt that catch share management fundamentally changes the nature of the fishing workforce. It reverses the declining job trend under conventional management, shifting a largely part-time, lower paid workforce to a more stable, full-time, better paid workforce over the long-term.

Studies show improved safety and satisfaction

Catch share fisheries are substantially safer than derby-style fisheries, and improving safety has often been a goal for catch shares.22 As derby fisheries in the United States and British Columbia became more frenetic just prior to catch share implementation, safety indices - as measured by incidence of injuries, search and rescue missions, lost vessels and deaths - plummeted.23,24,25 In the five years after catch share implementation, these same fisheries saw a 2.5 fold increase in safety, using the same indicators.26

The Alaska sablefish and halibut catch share fisheries are some of the best studied when it comes to safety. In the years immediately prior to catch shares, search and rescue missions were up by more than 30%.27 In the five years after catch shares, search and rescue missions decreased by more than 70%, while fatalities declined 15%.28,29

And numbers aren’t the only thing that changed. Almost 9 out of 10 fishermen in the halibut fishery thought their catch share made fishing safer.30 This may have been one important reason why fishermen working under catch share systems consistently rated their job satisfaction significantly higher than it was under derby style management.31

Catch shares designed to preserve fleets and maintain access

It’s worth noting that catch shares make it possible to preserve what people value about the fleet. What is the right number of boats and jobs for a fishing fleet? This can only be determined by the managers and stakeholders of the fishery, taking into account the unique nature of each situation. Every fishery has different needs and therefore will require different workforces. When designing a catch share, there are a few key design features that help a fishery achieve its desired outcomes.

Some fisheries have implemented concentration limits that set a cap on the total percentage of shares one entity can hold or fish. The percent at which the cap is set varies according to the specific needs of a fishery and is generally reflective of the level of concentration in the fishery prior to catch share implementation. For example, in the New Zealand hoki fishery, where increasing economic value was the primary goal, the cap is set at 45%, whereas, to limit consolidation, the Alaskan halibut fishery has a lower cap of up to 1.5% for a combination of areas.32 In the Gulf of Mexico commercial red snapper catch share program, no one individual or corporation can hold shares greater than 6% of the catch. Recent reports show that 85.4% of shareholders were not impaired by share concentration.33 Restrictions that limit trading to certain categories of vessels, such as size or gear type, and rules that require the owner of a catch share to be on board the boat when the catch is landed may also be helpful in ensuring a particular character of the fleet.

Bottom line

Fishing jobs are dependent on abundant healthy fish stocks. Catch shares are a proven management approach for ending overfishing and reversing the declines of stocks. Catch shares do change the nature of fishing jobs, from a larger, part-time, more seasonal work force to a smaller, full-time, safer work force. Jobs under catch shares are also substantially higher paying, including for crew members. And importantly, catch shares can be designed to promote certain fleet characteristics through use of design elements such as concentration limits and shareholder stipulations.

Sources

1 Costello, C., S. D. Gaines and J. Lynham. 2008. Can Catch Shares Prevent Fisheries Collapse?. Science. 321: 1678-1681.

2 Heal, G. and W. Schlenker. 2008. Sustainable Fisheries. Nature 455: 1044-1045.

3 Worm, B., R. Hilborn, J. Baum, T. Branch, J. Collie, C. Costello, et al. July 2009. Rebuilding Global Fisheries. Science 325: 578-85

4 Weber, P. 1994. Net Loss: Fish, Jobs, and the Marine Environment. Worldwatch Paper 120. Washington, DC.

5 Wilen, J. and K. Casey. 1997. Impacts of ITQs on Labor: Employment and Remuneration Effects. Pp. 315-333 in G. Palsson and Gudrun Petersdottir, eds., Social Implications of Quota Systems in Fisheries; Proceedings of a Seminar Held in the Vestman Islands in May 1996. TemaNord1997:593. Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers.

6 Redstone Strategy Group, LLC. 2007. Assessing the Potential for LAPPS in U.S. Fisheries.

7 AK regional office of NMFS, 2006b. Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Management Area Pollock Seasons, 1991-2003 [PDF]. Retrieved March 17, 2006.

8 International Pacific Halibut Commission (IPHC). 2006. Past Halibut Opening Dates. Retrieved April 20, 2006.

9 Knapp, G., 2006. Selected Economic Impacts of Crab Rationalization on Kodiak: Preliminary Results. ComFish Alaska 2006.

10 Pacific Whiting Conservation Cooperative. 2005. PWCC News Volume 8 Issue 2, November 2005 [PDF].

11 Pacific Whiting Conservation Cooperative (PWCC). 2006. PWCC Catch Management Program.

12 Shotton, R. 2001. Case studies on the effects of transferable fishing rights on fleet capacity and concentration of quota ownership [PDF]. FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 412.

13 Weeks, H., Hutton, L. 1997. Shoreside Whiting Observation Program: 1997 [PDF]. Marine Finfish Program, Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife.

14 Grafton, R.Q., 1996. Individual transferable quotas: theory and practice. Reviews in Fish Biology and Fisheries. Volume 6 Pages 5-20

15 Wilen, J. and K. Casey. 1997. op. cit.

16 Redstone Strategy Group, LLC. 2007. op. cit.

17 Redstone Strategy Group, LLC. 2007. Assessing the potential for LAPPs in U.S. fisheries. Report prepared for Environmental Defense, 41 pp., Washington, DC.

18 Murawski, S. A. 2009. NOAA Testimony before the Subcommittee on Insular Affairs, Oceans, and Wildlife, Committee on Natural Resources, U.S. House of Representatives.

19 Based on unpublished aggregated logbook data from IPHC (including average crew per vessel and total number of vessels) and Hiatt et al. 2007. Stock assessment and fishery evaluation report for the groundfish fisheries of the Gulf of Alaska and Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands area: Economic Status of the groundfish fisheries off Alaska, 2006. AFSC/NMFS/NOAA. Seattle, Washington.

20 GSGislason & Associates Ltd. “Employment Impacts of ITQ Fisheries in Pacific Canada”, Prepared for Canada Fisheries & Oceans, Ottawa, March 2008.

21 Ibid.

22 National Marine Fisheries Service: Alaska Regional Office, 2008. BSAI Crab Rationalization FAQ.

23 Iudicello, S., Weber, M. and R. Wieland. 1999. Fish, Markets, and Fishermen: The Economics of Overfishing. Island Press

24 Shotton, R. 2001. op. cit.

25 Woodley, C., 2000. Quota Based Fishery Management Regimes. International Fishing Industry Safety and Health Conference: Innovative Approaches to Investigating and Preventing Fishing Vessel Casualties. October 24, 2000

26 Redstone Strategy Group, LLC. 2007. op. cit.

27 Woodley, C. 2000. op. cit.

28 Lincoln, J., Hudson, D., Conway, G., and R. Pescatore. 2002. Proceedings of the International Fishing Industry Saftey and Health Conference. October 23-25, 2000 Woods Hole, Massachusetts, U.S.A

29 Woodley, C. 2000. op. cit.

30 Knapp, G. 1999. Effects of IFQ Management on Fishing Safety: Survey Responses of Alaska Halibut Fishermen. ISER Working Paper Series: Surveys of Alaska Halibut Fishermen About Effects of IFQ Management

31 Redstone Strategy Group, LLC. 2007. op. cit.

32 Muse, B. 1999. Regression Analysis of Alaska Halibut and Sablefish QS prices, 1995-1998. Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission, Juneau Alaska.

33 National Marine Fisheries Service. 2009. 2008 Gulf of Mexico Red Snapper Individual Fishing Quota Annual Report. Southeast Regional Office.

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